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Articles
IS IT TIME TO REVISIT THE DOCTRINE OF "STATE ACTION"
IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERCOLLEGIATE AND
INTERSCHOLASTIC SPORTS?
RICHARD

J.

HUNTER, JR.*

&

PAULA ALEXANDER BECKER**

Consider the following hypothetical. Coach Mysliwy, the soccer coach at St. Swithen's High School, a private Catholic High
School in Belmar, NewJersey, decided to start his team's preseason
practices in mid-July. One day, while practicing at the nearby Sea
Girt Army Camp, Coach Mysliwy noticed that the team from the
neighboring town of Poseidon, a public high school, was also conducting a preseason practice session. Coach Mysliwy approached
the rival coach and suggested a "controlled scrimmage." All went
well until a parent from a different local high school reported the
"match" to the New Jersey State Interscholastic Athletic Association
(NJSIAA), the governing body for high school (interscholastic) athletics in the state of New Jersey. 1 The NJSIAA investigated the incident and unilaterally decided to suspend both coaches for ten
games for conducting an "improper and unscheduled preseason
scrimmage" in violation of NJSIAA rules. 2 These actions are reported to St. Swithen's, and Coach Mysliwy is summarily fired from
his position after twenty-five years at the school. Incensed, Coach
Mysliwy contacted a local sports-law firm to determine if his "constitutional rights" were violated by either St. Swithen's or the NJSIAA.
The coach at Poseidon High School was also fired for violating the
NJSIAA Rules.
The question presented by this article is whether either of the
high school coaches have an action for violation of their due pro* Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University Professor of Legal
Studies
** Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University Associate Professor of
Management
1. See NJSIAA, http://www.njsiaa.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) (explaining
that NJSLAA is governing body for high school athletics in New Jersey).
2. See id. (conducting unscheduled preseason scrimmage is violation of one of

NJSIAA's rules).
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cess rights.3 This article also explores the implications had this incident occurred between two four-year colleges who were members of
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution protect against the deprivation of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 4 The Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment provides basic procedural safeguards to a
person accused of a crime before being deprived of "life, liberty, or
property. '5 As originally enacted, the first eight amendments to the
Constitution, included in the Bill of Rights, were designed solely to
protect citizens against the actions of the federal government, but
the amendments did not apply to the states until the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.6 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state should not create any law denying a
3. This article mainly concerns "state action" and whether constitutional protections apply under the circumstances described above. Another aspect of due
process rights is the concept of "fundamental fairness." See Henry Friendly, Some
Kind of Hearing,123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-93 (1975) (pointing out fundamental fairness aspect of due process rights). This includes an individual's right to be
adequately notified of charges or proceedings involving him/her or his/her interests, and it includes the opportunity to be heard in front of a neutral decision
maker. See id. (explaining fundamental fairness includes right to be notified of
charges and opportunity to be heard in front of neutral decision maker). This
minimum protection extends to all proceedings, civil or criminal, by the government or by other parties that may result in an individual's deprivation of life, liberty, or property. See id. (extending minimum protection to all proceedings, civil
or criminal, by government). The late Judge Henry Friendly denotes these procedural safeguards in both content and relative priority: "[a]n unbiased tribunal;"
"[n]otice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it;" "[a]n opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken;" the right to
present evidence, "including the right to call witnesses;" the right to know opposing evidence; the right to "cross-examine adverse witnesses;" a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented; an opportunity to be represented by counsel;
the requirement that the tribunal prepares a record of the evidence presented;
and the requirement that the tribunal prepares written findings of fact and reasons
(conclusions of law) for its decision. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that Bill of
Rights only applies to Federal Government). The Bill of Rights comprises the first
ten amendments to the United States Constitution of 1789. See id. (explaining
amendments comprising Bill of Rights). The Ninth and Tenth Amendments, however, affect the people's relationship with both the federal and state governments.
See id. The Ninth Amendment provides, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Tenth Amendment provides, "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
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United States citizen of rights without due process of law or deny a
7
citizen equal protection under the law.

In 1873, the United States Supreme Court decided a series of
cases holding that the fundamental rights protected by the Bill of
Rights were enacted against federal action and were not privileges
and immunities of national citizenship.8 Therefore, under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, state action was not protected by the Bill of Rights.9 The decision in the
Slaughterhouse Cases eviscerated the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause as a possible source of protecting individual rights against state abridgment. 10 Subsequently, the Court
has relied on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses to protect an individual's rights against state

action. 11
Over time, the Supreme Court altered its jurisprudence and
held that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights may be sufficiently
"fundamental" and, therefore, worthy of protection against state
abridgment through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. The Court accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause protected some rights provided by the Bill of
Rights yet rejected the view that the Clause incorporated the Bill of
Rights. 12 The Court created the concept of selective incorporation
states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
7. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."). The Fourteenth Amendment is one of three reconstruction amendments, concerned with the abolition of the institution of slavery, which had been
originally recognized and protected in the 1789 constitution. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1873) (describing creation and purpose of Fourteenth
Amendment).
8. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 78 (noting boundaries of Fourteenth
Amendment as enacted by Congress).
9. See id. (leaving privilege and immunity rights to state jurisdiction).
10. See Michael Anthony Lawrence, Reviving a Natural Right: The Freedom of
Autonomy, 42 WILLAME=IE L. REv. 123, 182 (2006) ("The Slaughterhouse Cases'
effect on the privileges or immunities clause is the classic case in point, where an
erroneous interpretation of a constitutional provision by the Court effectively put
the provision out of play for (at least) the following 130-plus years.").
11. For a further discussion on state action, see infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
12. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947) (rejecting incorporation
of Bill of Rights in Fourteenth Amendment), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964). Interestingly, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws," by its own terms, limits only actions of the states. See U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. There is no similar provision of the Constitution that is
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by doing a case-by-case analysis of whether each amendment in the
Bill of Rights should be made applicable against the states. 13 The
Court thus created various tests or criteria to determine which provisions of the Bill of Rights are protected against both federal and
state action. In Palko v. Connecticut,14 the Supreme Court noted that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated principles which are inherent to ordered liberty. 15 The Supreme Court later held in
applicable to actions of the federal government. The United States Supreme
Court, however, has ruled that most actions by the federal government that would
deny "equal protection" constitute a "deprivation of liberty" within the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954) (holding racial segregation practiced in public schools in Washington, D.C.
deprived African-American pupils of their "liberty" in violation of Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
13. See Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of
Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 979
n.12 (1985). Twining v. New Jersey, Palko v. Connecticut, and Adamson v. California
are the three leading cases in which the Supreme Court rejects the "total incorporation" doctrine. See generally, Twining v. NewJersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969); Adamson, 332 U.S. at 50-123. Professors Lockhart, Kamisar, and Chopper
note that the Twining-Adason view that the "fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is not incorporated in the fourteenth was rejected in Malloy v.
Hogan." WILLIAM LOCKHART, YALE KAMISAR & JESSE CHOPPER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 292 (1980) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination was guaranteed to defendant and noting that "[t]he Court thus has
rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a
'watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of
Rights'" (citing Malloy)).
The "total incorporation" position was strongly supported in the dissenting
opinions in Adamson. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-93 (Black, J., dissenting) (supporting total incorporation in dissenting opinion). In the principal dissent byJustice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Black commented:
If the choice must be between the selective process of the Palko decision
applying some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the States, or the
Twining rule applying none of them, I would choose the Palko selective
process. But rather than accept either of these choices, I would follow
what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendmentto extend to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the
Bill of Rights. To hold that this Court can determine what, if any, protections of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to
frustrate the great design of a written Constitution.
Id. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting). Conversely, Justice Harlan strenuously and regularly objected to this point of view. In Malloy, he wrote:
The consequence is .

..

inevitably disregard of all relevant differences

which may exist between state and federal criminal law and its enforcement. The ultimate result is compelled uniformity, which is inconsistent
with the purpose of our federal system and which is achieved either by
encroachment on the States' sovereign powers or by dilution in federal
law enforcement of the specific protections in the Bill of Rights.
Malloy, 378 U.S. at 16-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
15. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (noting that Fourteenth Amendment incorporates principle of ordered liberty). Interestingly and perhaps surprisingly, the
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Duncan v. Louisiana16 that the rights required to achieve justice are
included in the Fourteenth Amendment, namely those rights that
17
are "fundamental to the American scheme of justice.
Court had ruled earlier that states are not required to provide jury trials under the
principle of ordered liberty. See id. (describing Court's interpretation of what constitutes ordered liberty).
16. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
17. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149. Although the Supreme Court continued to employ the "Palko selective incorporation process" when it decided Duncan in 1968, it
no longer employed the Cardozo-Frankfurter terminology, which inquired into
whether a particular guarantee of the Bill of Rights was "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" or required by the 'immutable principles of justice' as conceived
by a civilized society. Id. at 149 n.14.
There is a separate debate concerning whether all aspects and elements of an
incorporated right must be deemed incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
A majority of the Court has held that if the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a
right, then all aspects or issues of the right will receive the same protection against
state action through the Fourteenth Amendment that it receives against federal
action through the Bill of Rights. Opposing this view, ChiefJustice Burger, Justice
Powell, and Justice Rehnquist would have ruled that some aspects of the Bill of
Rights are not so fundamental that they must be held binding against the states as
a matter of due process. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39-53 (1978) (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting); id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Accordingly, a right incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment is not automatically afforded the same amount of protection against state action as it is against federal action. See Crist, 437 U.S. at 39-53
(Powell,J., dissenting) (expanding view that some rights are not as fundamental as
others and, therefore, should not receive same amount of protection from state
action as they do from federal action). Additionally, in Apodaca v. Oregon, the
Court held that although the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the right to a jury trial, the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict required in a federal case is not afforded the same level of fundamental value and,
therefore, is not required by due process. 406 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1972) (holding
that unanimity is not required for juries in state trials because it is not as fundamental of right as right to jury trial).
Consequently, while states must afford criminal defendants charged with a
serious offense ajury trial, the states do not have to require a unanimous verdict by
thejury. See id. at 413 (describing situation where Court considers one right "more
fundamental" than another and, therefore, applies it differently). The result of
the Court's decision is that the Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial is entitled to
lesser protection in state than in federal courts - at least as to the requirement of
a unanimous jury verdict. See id.
Further, the Supreme Court has also refused to set aside those convictions
solely because the verdict was obtained by a "substantial majority" of the jurors
rather than a unanimous verdict. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360
(1972) (rejecting argument that allowing less than unanimous verdict undermines
.reasonable doubt" standard generally required by due process); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (noting that reasonable doubt standard frequently
satisfies due process requirement). While the general rule is that state courts only
require a majority vote for a guilty verdict, the Court has held that the verdict must
be unanimous when the jury is composed of only six persons. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979) ("[W]e believe that conviction by a non-unanimous
six-memberjury in a state criminal trial for a non-petty offense deprives an accused
of his constitutional right to trial by jury."). Statutorily, the number of jurors for
federal criminal trials is twelve. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978)
(holding that jury composed of five people was insufficient to meet constitutional
requirements); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) ("We hold that the 12-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007

5

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1

196

VILLANOVA SPORTS

&

ENT. LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14: p. 191

In his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,1 8 Justice
Goldberg offered a differing opinion on incorporation. Justice
Goldberg believed that judges should not determine what are the
fundamental rights based on their personal beliefs but rather based
on the traditions and beliefs of United States citizens.1 9 Over the
years, the Court has used the Palko and Duncan tests to determine
that the majority of the Bill of Rights provisions are so fundamental
that they apply to the states in addition to the federal government.2 0 These fundamental rights include: the First Amendment's
protections of religion, speech, assembly, and the right of individuals to petition their government for grievances. 2 1 Additional examman panel is not a necessary ingredient of 'trial by jury'... . ."). The Constitution is
silent on the issue of the number of jurors, providing only that there must be a
sufficient number ofjurors to provide "adequate group determination" and a "fair
cross section" of the community. Ballew, 435 U.S at 245.
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1975).
19. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (explaining how justices should determine
which rights are fundamental). "In determining which rights are fundamental,
judges are not left to decide cases in light of their personal or private notions." Id.
at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)). "[T]he Due Process Clause protects those liberties that are 'so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' Id.
at 487 (quoting Snyder). The argument concerning an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment being simply a digression into ajudge's personal opinion was
addressed by Justice Frankfurter in Adamson:
Judicial review of the [the Due Process Clause] of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably imposes on this Court an exercise of judgment upon
the whole course of the proceedings in order to ascertain whether they
offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the
most heinous offenses. These standards ofjustice are not authoritatively
formulated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a pharmacopoeia. But neither does the application of the Due Process Clause imply
that judges are wholly at large. The judicial judgment in applying the
Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions of
justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal
judgment.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
20. See generally Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (describing test
used to determine if right was so fundamental as to apply to states). It is interesting to note that as a matter ofjurisprudence, Palko was later overruled in Benton v.
Maryland. See 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). Justice Marshall wrote for the Court in
Benton:
Our recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic
constitutional rights can be denied by the States so long as the totality of
the circumstances does not disclose a denial of "fundamental fairness."
Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is "fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice," the same constitutional standards
apply against both the State and Federal governments.
Id. at 795.
21. See Charles Warren, The New 'Liberty' Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
I-HARv. L. REv. 431, 433 (1926) (stating that First Amendment is protected under
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ples include the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure
provision; 2 2 the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy, 23 the privilege against self incrimination, 24 and the bar against
taking property without just compensation; 2 5 the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminal proceedings, 26 confrontation
29
and cross-examination of witnesses, 27 speedy trial, 28 public trial,
jury trial,3 0 and compulsory process for obtaining witnesses; 3 1 and
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 3 2 Conversely, there are certain provisions in the Bill
the Fourteenth amendment); see also EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND
WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 133-34 (1957) (explaining which provisions of Bill of Rights

are fundamental). In Winsy v. John Oster ManufacturingCompany, the Western District Court of Pennsylvania noted:
Indeed, as late as 1922, the Supreme Court took the view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not make even the First Amendment binding on
the States. In 1925, however, it ventured the tentative assumption that
the 'freedom' of speech protected by the First Amendment was included
in the 'liberty' which the Fourteenth Amendment required the States to
respect. Thus began what Charles Warren called 'the new liberty.'
336 F. Supp. 663, 665 n.5 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
22. See Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) (noting Fourth Amendment
is enforceable against states through Fourteenth Amendment).
23. See Benton, 395 U.S. at 794 (finding that Fifth Amendment is applicable
against states and overruling Palko).
24. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) ("We hold today that the Fifth
Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.").
25. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005) (explaining
takings of property without justification). The application of "takings" is highly

controversial. See generally, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad
Policy and Bad Judgment, 38 URB. LAw. 201 (2006) (describing application of "takings" as controversial). Kelo is one of the most cited and criticized cases decided by
the Supreme Court in recent decades. See id. at 217.
26. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding that when
provision of Bill of Rights is essential to fair trial, it is obligated on states by Fourteenth Amendment).
27. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (holding right to confront
witness against defendant is fundamental right).
28. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (enforcing right to
speedy trial against states).
29. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948) (holding public trial is part of
due process).
30. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding jury trials are
fundamental to "the American scheme of justice").
31. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) ("The right of an accused
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor stands on no lesser
footing than the other Sixth Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the States.").
32. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) ("The command of
the Eighth Amendment, banning 'cruel and unusual punishments,' stems from
the Bill of Rights of 1688.... And it is applicable to the States by reason of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (citing Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947))).
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of Rights that the Court has held are not so fundamental as to be
applicable to the states. These include the grand jury indictment
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment 33 and the civil jury trial guarantee of the Seventh Amendment for all suits at common law involving more than twenty dollars. 34 Also, the Court has yet to rule on
whether the Eighth Amendment's bar against "excessive bail" ap35
plies to the states.

Supreme Court decisions from the 1970's indicate that the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantees may extend past
mere incorporation of various rights enumerated in the first eight
amendments; the due process guarantees may reach rights not expressly found in the Bill of Rights or anywhere else in the Constitution. For example, while the right to privacy is not expressly
mentioned in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has recognized
such a right or at least "a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy." 36 In Griswold v. Connecticut,37 Justice Douglas opined that a
right of privacy was within the "penumbras" or "emanations" of various provisions of the Bill of Rights.38 In 1973, the Supreme Court
strengthened its Griswold decision by holding that the right of perThe historic punishments that were cruel and unusual when the Eighth
Amendment was adopted included "burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on
the wheel," the rack and thumbscrew, and in some circumstances, even solitary
confinement. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890); see also Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940) (rack and thumbscrew); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160,
167-68 (1890) (solitary confinement).
33. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that "the
substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by
information" is due process of law). Thus, states may experiment with what has
been termed as the "information system" and charge crimes in a manner that does
not utilize a Grand Jury. See id. (explaining states' use of "information system"
which does not require use of Grand Jury).
34. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876) (noting that civil jury trial
guarantee has been held to apply only to trials in federal courts).
35. See Preliminary Proceedings, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PROC. 203, 305

n.986 (2006) ("It is unclear whether the excessive bail prohibition applies to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has indicated that the Excessive Bail Clause 'has been assumed' to
apply to the states."); see also Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (applying
Eighth Amendment to states through Fourteenth Amendment). Bail becomes excessive when a court sets it higher than is reasonably necessary either to ensure a
defendant's appearance at trial or to promote other compelling governmental
interests.
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (discussing history of personal privacy decisions).
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. See id. at 484 (noting various Bill of Rights guarantees creating zones of
privacy).
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sonal privacy is implicit in the concept of liberty protected by the
39
Due Process Clause.
II.

THE ATHLETIC CONTEXT

While a number of provisions of the United States Constitution
prohibit the government from infringing on individual constitutional rights, only the Thirteenth Amendment, prohibiting the institution of slavery whether imposed by the government or by a
40 If
private party, extends to both private and governmental action.
an action does not involve slavery, or what is sometimes referred to
as a "badge of slavery," it is necessary to attribute the action to the
government or its agencies and officials, acting under color of law,
39. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (holding that right of personal privacy is basic
human right of fundamental importance in society); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (striking down criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy in Texas and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick).

In Lawrence, the Houston police arrested two adult men, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, when the police entered Lawrence's home and found
the two men having consensual sex. 539 U.S. at 563. The two men were charged
and convicted under a Texas state statute making it a crime to engage in "deviate
sexual intercourse." Id. The statute defined deviate sexual intercourse as "any
contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of
another person; or . . . the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another
person with an object." Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN § 21.06(a) (2003)).
Delivering the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that there were three
issues in dispute: (1) whether the statute violated the plaintiffs' rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of equal protection; (2) whether the statute
violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of
due process; and (3) whether Bowers v. Hardwick, the 1986 Supreme Court case
upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy law, should be overturned. See id. at 564. In
Bowers, the Court refused to invalidate a Georgia statute that made it a crime for
both heterosexuals and gay people to engage in sodomy. See Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's opinion. The Court ruled that the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights were infringed when they were arrested. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Justice Kennedy stated:
[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal
bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the [Due Process
Clause of the] Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make
this choice.
Id. at 567. Justice O'Connor joined the majority in the judgment and wrote a
concurring opinion in Lawrence. See id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor based her concurrence on an equal protection analysis rather than
a due process analysis. See id. at 579 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
40. See Alexander Tsesis, FurtheringAmerican Freedom: Civil Rights and the Thir-

teenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REv. 307, 311 (2004) (discussing Thirteenth Amendment's uniqueness of and its effect on civil rights abuses).
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to find the action unconstitutional. 4 1 It is well settled, however,
that the act complained of does not necessarily have to be performed directly by a government actor. State action has included
actions by private individuals or organizations that function in a capacity traditionally reserved as the exclusive prerogative of the
state. 42 Another type of state action occurs when the government
requires, sanctions, or significantly encourages private acts of
43

discrimination.
Two cases involving state action in the area of sports law merit

special consideration: NCAA v. Tarkanian44 and Brentwood Academy
v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association.45 In Tarkanian, the
United States Supreme Court dealt with a well-known figure embroiled in a bitter and protracted controversy with the NCAA.4 6
The status of the NCAA was at the heart of the controversy. 4 7 The
Court determined that the NCAA was a voluntary association of

public and private universities that established rules ("legislation")
for its members regarding intercollegiate sports. 48 Pursuant to
finding that several of these rules had been violated, the, NCAA
urged the University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV), where
Tarkanian served as a highly successful and ubiquitous men's collegiate basketball coach, to suspend Tarkanian for various recruiting violations. 4 9 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Nevada Supreme Court's decision and found that the NCAA was
neither a state actor nor operating under color of state law. 50 As a

result, the Court held that Coach Tarkanian could not sue the
41. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (discussing state
action requirement).
42. For a further discussion of state action through private activity, see infra
notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
43. For a further discussion of state action through government supported
action, see infra notes 64-114 and accompanying text.
44. 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (discussing case in which Coach Tarkanian sued
NCAA for allegedly violating his constitutional rights by suspending him without
conducting hearing that would generally be required to satisfy due process

requirements).
45. 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (holding association was so entwined with state that its
actions could fairly be considered state action).
46. See generally Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (holding that NCAA was not
state actor and was not operating under color of state law).
47. See id. at 181-82 (requiring NCAA's actions to be state action and to be
under color of state law to be held liable).
48. See id. at 183 (describing structure of NCAA).
49. See id. at 185-87 (discussing NCAA's investigation of UNLV and its ultimate findings).

50. See id. at 199; see also Alain Lapter, Bloom v. NCAA: A ProceduralDue Process
Analysis and the Need for Reform, 12 SPORTS LAw.J. 255, 276-78 (2005) (discussing
issue of "Who is a State Actor?").
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NCAA for allegedly violating his constitutional rights by suspending
him without conducting the type of hearing required to satisfy due
51
process requirements.
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Brentwood Academy departed
from its decision in Tarkanianand held that an association that regulates high school sports within a single state and to which most
public schools belong was so entwined with the state that its actions
can fairly be considered state action because: (1) its governing body
is made up mostly of public school officials; (2) its meetings are
held during regular school hours; (3) its employees are eligible to
join the state retirement system, which is funded by gate receipts
from sports contests; and (4) the participation by student athletes
was held to satisfy the state board's physical education requirement. 52 A detailed discussion of why these cases produced differing

results will follow a preliminary analysis and review of the "state action" requirement.
III.

THE IMPORT OF THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO STATE ACTION

A reading of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, including those provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been made
applicable to the states, denotes that the language restricts only governmental action or the actions of parties acting "under color of
law." The acts of purely private individuals do not fall within the
prohibitions of either amendment. 53 In Lugar v. Edmondson,54 the
Court commented that the "state action" requirement protects individual rights by limiting federal law while avoiding the imposition
55
of responsibility on a State for conduct it cannot control.
When Congress enacted Title 42, Section 1983 of the United
States Code as the statutory remedy for violations of the Constitu51. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199 (reversing Nevada Supreme Court
decision).
52. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
291-92, 302 (2001) (discussing details of Association); see also Lisa Mastrogiovanni,
Fourteenth Amendment - Deeds of Private OrganizationsConstitute State Actions Under the
Fourteenth Amendment Where There is Pervasive Entwinement Between the Private Organization and a GovernmentalEntity - Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 711, 714-17 (2002) (describing
entwinement theory as basis for state action).
53. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883) (discussing constitutionality of Civil Rights Act).
54. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
55. See id. at 936 (reasoning that "[c]areful adherence to the 'state action'
requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law").
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tion, it specified that the conduct at issue must have occurred
"under color of law." 56 This attaches liability only to those wrongdoers that act with the apparent authority of a State, even if they act
outside of or abuse their given authority. 5 7 In United States v. Classic,58 the Court explained that the "[in] isuse of power, possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color
59
of' state law."
As a result, the concept of "state action" emerged as a basis for
proceeding and as the source of many important pronouncements
by the United States Supreme Court. State action includes actions
taken by legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative branches
or agencies of both the federal and state governments and their
60
political subdivisions, including counties, cities, and districts.
State action also includes conduct or actions performed by government officials in their official capacities "under color of law," 61 even
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia...").
57. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (focusing on those "who
carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether
they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it").
58. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
59. Id. at 326.
60. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (holding that Amtrak, with President of United States having authority to appoint majority of its directors, is "part of the Government for purposes of the First
Amendment" notwithstanding authorizing statute's statement to contrary). A government agency may include a corporationcreated by a federal statute "for the furtherance of governmental objectives." Id.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes
of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id. Section 1983 was originally enacted on April 20, 1871, as part of the Ku Klux
Klan Act. See Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559 (2004). Itwas known as the Ku Klux
Klan Act because one of its main purposes was to provide a civil remedy against the
abuses and intimidations that were being committed by the Klan in many Southern
states. See Christopher Long, Ku Klux Klan, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, Jun. 6,
2001, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/KK/vek2.html.
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though their actions may be specifically forbidden by law.6 2 Since

its decision in Brentwood Academy, the Supreme Court has held that
state action includes actions taken by ostensibly private parties, entities, or organizations but only under well-established and widely
63
recognized criteria.
A.

Public and Governmental Functions

In several important cases, the Court has established that certain actions or activities undertaken by private individuals or organizations that are "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State"
may be characterized as "public" or "government" functions, and
such actions may be treated as "state action," subject to the due
64
process provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
A number of these cases have evolved in the area of conducting
elections, a function that is traditionally and normally an exclusive
state function - courts have invalidated racial discrimination by a
group or by individuals who exercise control over the selection of
candidates. In 1944, the Court held that the Texas Democratic
Party constitutionally could not exclude African-Americans from
voting in a primary election where the party's nominee for the general election was to be chosen. 65 Likewise, in 1953, the Court ruled
62. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 340 (1879) (holding that actions
of jury commissioner who discriminated against African-Americans selecting jury
panels were acts done "under color of law" and thus were state action); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (finding that actions of police officer who
beats prisoner to death in effort to obtain confession, or stands by while third party
beats prisoner to death, constitutes state action because officer, while acting in his
official capacity, deprived prisoner of life without due process of law).
63. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
295-97 (2001) (holding that association under certain circumstances is so entwined with state that its actions can fairly be considered state action).
64. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
65. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-65 (1944) (holding that exclusion
of African-Americans from voting in Texas Democratic Party primary by adopting
resolution restricting party membership to white citizens was state action in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment). It is interesting to note that Thurgood Marshall was recorded as counsel for the African-American petitioners. See id. at 650.
The Court's statement may be relevant to a possible appraisal of Tarkanian and
Brentwood Academy:
[W]e are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity of decision in
constitutional questions. However, when convinced of former error, this
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent ....

[T]his Court

throughout its history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions.... This is particularly true when the
decision believed erroneous is the application of a constitutional principle rather than an interpretation of the Constitution to extract the principle itself.
Id. at 665-66 (citations omitted).
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that a Texan county political group could not exclude AfricanAmericans from a pre-primary election when the winner of that election nearly always ran unopposed in the later party primary and
66
general election.
A second application of the state action through private activity
rule involves so-called "company towns. '67 In Marsh v. Alabama,68 a
private corporation, the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, owned a
town (Chickasaw, Alabama) that possessed "all the characteristics of
any other American town. ' 69 The corporation pursued a trespass
conviction of a distributor of religious literature, a member of the
Jehovah's Witnesses, who refused to leave the town's business district. 70

The Supreme Court held the corporation's action to be

"state action" which violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments
because the town's streets, although privately owned, were the functional equivalent of city streets, and the residents of this company
town had as great an interest in receiving information as did those
71
of an ordinary town.
66. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 476-77 (1953) (describing process of
exclusion).
67. See Richard H.W. Maloy, "Under Color of' - What Does It Mean?, 56 MERCER
L. REv. 565, 600 n.290 (2005) (defining "company town" as "a municipality wholly
owned by a private corporation").
68. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
69. Id. at 502.
70. See id. at 503-04 (describing case history).
71. See id. at 507-09 ("[People living in company-owned towns], just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country.... There is
no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen."). In other similar cases, however, the Court has not
found that privately conducted activity amounted to a public or government function. But see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982) (holding conduct of nursing home in deciding to discharge or transfer Medicaid patients to lower levels of
care, although wholly funded and extensively regulated by state, was not state action because such function was not exclusive province of state); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (holding specialized private school, whose income
was derived primarily from public sources and which was regulated by public authorities, was not acting under color of law for purposes of Section 1983 when
school discharged certain employees); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976)
(holding that large, self-contained shopping center, similar to business district or
ordinary town, was "functional equivalent" of municipality because it possessed all
civil attributes of town), overrulingAmalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968);Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
353 (1974) (holding regulated electric company, which was granted monopoly by
state, was not engaged in state action when it terminated user's service without
notice or hearing because "the supplying of utility service is not traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State"). In both Blum and Rendell-Baker, the Court
based its decision on the following major points: (1) the decisions were not compelled or influenced by any state regulation; and (2) the relationship of the organi-
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Significant State Involvement

In terms of analyzing both Tarkanian and Brentwood Academy, a
significantly greater number of cases have involved a determination
of the question of state action where the government has either
required or significantly encouraged the specific acts complained
of - especially in the area of racial discrimination in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. 7 2 At the outset, it should be stated
that the Constitution does not require the government to outlaw
acts of private discrimination, and the government's mere allow-

ance of such conduct would not be enough to find "state action."
The Supreme Court concluded in Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority73 that the Fourteenth Amendment "'erects no shield against

merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful' . . .
unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifesta'' 74
tions has been found to have become involved in it.

To bring a constitutional claim, the state must either "compel"
or "significantly participate" in the private conduct. As might be
expected, whether state action may be found requires a case-by-case
determination, which will often turn on the particular facts brought
before a court. 75 As the test applied in Burton indicates, "'the aczation with the state was not different from that of many contractors performing

services for the government. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841-43.
72. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (ruling
use of preemptory challenges by private litigant in civil trial significantly involves
state). The Court applied the same rule in the case of a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44 (1992);
see also Robert W. Gurry, The Jury Is Out: The Urgent Need for a New Approach in
Deciding When Religion-Based Peremptory Strikes Violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 18 REGENT U. L. REv. 91, 95 (2005/2006) ("Exercising a peremptory strike
based on a prospective juror's race or gender is now unconstitutional as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); cf Judging the
Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits the Dangers of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 119 HARP. L. REv. 2121, 2135 (2006) (noting prosecutors who wield peremptory challenges and who might view minority jurors as threats to guilty verdict
are likely to be successful in removing most or all minority jurors from venire).
73. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
74. Id. at 721 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
75. See id. at 722 (discussing attention to facts needed to determine existence
of state action). In Burton the Court noted:
Because the virtue of the right to equal protection of the laws could lie
only in the breadth of its application, its constitutional assurance was reserved in terms whose imprecision was necessary if the right were to be
enjoyed in the variety of individual-state relationships which the Amendment was designed to embrace. For the same reason, to fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the
Equal Protection Clause is an 'impossible task' which 'This Court has
never attempted.' Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can
the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed
its true significance.
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tion inhibited by the first section (Equal Protection Clause) of the
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to
be that of the States"' 76 and includes "'state participation through
any arrangement, management, funds or property.' 77
Several practical examples illustrate the requirement of "significant state involvement." In Peterson v. City of Greenville,78 a city ordinance required the racial segregation of public restaurants. 79 Ten
African-Americans remained seated at the lunch counter of a store
after "the manager announced that the 'lunch counter was being
closed and would everyone leave' the area." 80 The petitioners were
arrested and subsequently convicted in the Recorder's Court of the
City of Greenville, South Carolina for violating the state trespass
statute. 8 1 The Court concluded that "[w] hen a state agency passes a
law compelling persons to discriminate against other persons because of race," and then when a state's criminal processes are used
to enforce the mandated discrimination, a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment occurs.8 2 This violation arises even though private conduct abridging individual rights "does no violence to the
equal protection clause unless to some significant extent the state
83
. . . has been found to have become involved in it."
Id. (quoting Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).
In Reitman v. MulLey, the Court noted that its task would not be an easy one.
See 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967). "This Court has never attempted the 'impossible task'
of formulating an infallible test for determining whether the State 'in any of its
manifestations' has become significantly involved in private discriminations." Id. at
378 (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 722). The Court gave great deference to the
rationale put forth by the California Supreme Court and concluded:
Here the California court, armed as it was with the knowledge of the facts
and circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact of § 26
[of the California State Constitution], and familiar with the milieu in
which that provision would operate, has determined that the provision
would involve the State in private racial discriminations to an unconstitutional degree. We accept this holding of the California court.
Id. at 378-79. For a further discussion of Reitman, see infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
76. Burton, 365 U.S. at 721 (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13).
77. Id. at 722 (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
78. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
79. See id. at 246-47 (concerning Greenville segregation statute).
80. Id. at 246.
81. See id. 245-46.
82. Id. at 248.
83. Id. at 247 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961)). The same result was obtained in Lombard v. Louisiana,where the enforcement of segregation at refreshment counters in New Orleans was accomplished on
the basis of an official policy announced by public officials and not on the basis of
any state or local ordinance. See 373 U.S. 267, 268-69 (1963). The petitioners had
been charged and convicted of criminal mischief in a Louisiana state court. See id.
at 269.
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A second example of "significant state involvement" occurs
where the government administersa trust document that, by its terms,
requires discrimination based on race.8 4 The Court concluded that
where a will named a city as trustee of a school (Girard College),
the board operating the school was established by an act of the state
legislature.8 5 As an agent of the state, the Board transformed its
actions into state action, notwithstanding the fact that the underly86
ing documents were a will and a private trust document.
A third application of "significant state involvement" involves
87
joint action between government officials and private persons.
The context of the dispute was a garnishment and prejudgment attachment procedure.8 8 Justice White's opinion went beyond the
particular facts of the dispute and rejected the notion that a constitutional deprivation of due process could only apply where "there is
a usurpation or corruption of official power by the private litigant
or a surrender of judicial power to the private litigant in such a way
that the independence of the enforcing officer has been compromised to a significant degree."8 9 Instead, the Court ruled that constitutional requirements of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment apply whenever state officers act jointly with a private
creditor to secure property where the state statute authorizing such
an action is "procedurally defective." 90 Thus, the action of the private party is conduct that is also an action "under color of law" and
would support a suit under Section 1983.91
A fourth application of the "state involvement principle" involves the potential judicial enforcement of a private racially restrictive covenant. In Shelley v. Kraemer,9 2 the Court considered the
implications of a court being called upon to enforce a racially re93
strictive covenant found in the deeds of certain homeowners.
84. See Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (declaring
state's role in administration of trusts can violate Equal Protection Clause).
85. See id. (noting Girard College's Board of Trustees was state agency because it was run by Philadelphia).
86. See id. (explaining how Board's actions violated Equal Protection).
87. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 639 F.2d 1058, 1062 (4th Cir.
1981), affd in part,rev'd in part, 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (discussing situation of alleged
government wrongdoing during private civil action).
88. See id. (stating issue of case).
89. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 926.
90. Id. at 941.
91. Id. (concerning joint action between private litigant and government).
92. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
93. See id. at 4-5 (discussing issue of case). The covenant provided:
[T] he said property is hereby restricted to the use and occupancy for the
term of Fifty (50) years from this date, so that it shall be a condition all
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The plaintiff sought to enjoin an African-American, who had purchased a piece of property from a white owner, from taking possession and sought damages against the white seller through merit of
the restrictive covenants. 9 4 The Court conceded that the Fourteenth Amendment is directed against state action only and does
not reach private conduct - no matter how discriminatory. 95 The
Court, however, concluded that "among the civil rights intended to
be protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of
property." 96 Next, the Court concluded that "discriminations imposed by the state courts" that "den[y] equal [protection] of property rights to a designated class of citizens of specified race and
ancestry" cannot "be justified as proper exertions of state police
power. '9 7 Thus, the Court held that judicial action, even for the
enforcement of a private restrictive covenant against certain races,
is state action and falls within the scope of the Amendment's "field
of operation."9 8
The Court reaches a similar result where the government approves of private conduct. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,99 the
Supreme Court held that when a state regulatory agency approves a
practice of a regulated business, the practice may be considered as
state action. 10 0 The Court noted with approval, "[W]hen authority
derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some
respects, to its exercise by Government itself."''1 1
the time and whether recited and referred to as [sic] not in subsequent
conveyances and shall attach to the land, as a condition precedent to the
sale of the same, that hereafter no part of said property or any portion
thereof shall be, for said term of Fifty-years, occupied by any person not
of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the use of said
property for said period of time against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or other purpose by
people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.
Id.
94.
95.
only).
96.
97.

See id. at 6 (summarizing events leading to litigation).
See id. at 13 (defining Fourteenth Amendment as applying to state action
Id. at 10.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21 (1948).

98. See id. at 22-23 (defining judicial action as state action for purpose of Fourteenth Amendment).
99. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
100. See id. at 462-63 (determining that there was sufficiently close relation
between radio service and government to consider restrictions placed on
government).
101. Id. at 462 n.8 (citing Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401
(1950)); cf.Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944) ("[A] statutory system for
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The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Reitman v.
Mulkey, 10 2 where a state constitutional amendment both repealed
existing anti-discrimination in housing statutes and further prohibited the legislature from regulating the sale or rental of residential
property in the future. 10 3 As a result, a private apartment owner
refused to rent to a potential African-American tenant. 10 4 The majority of the Supreme Court struck down the constitutional amendment on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment because the state
constitutional amendment did more than just repeal anti-discrimination laws - its purpose was seen as encouraging racial discrimination. 10 5 The Court noted, "Section 26 was intended to authorize,
and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market.
The right to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the
State. The California Supreme Court believes that the section will
significantly encourage and involve the State in private
discriminations."'

10 6

Not all members of the Supreme Court agreed with the decision in Reitman.10 7 In fact, Justice Harlan penned a vigorous dissent
the selection of party nominees for inclusion on the general election ballot makes
the party which is required to follow these legislative directions an agency of the
state in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election."); Olcott v.
Supervisors, 83 U.S. 678, 695-96 (1872) (determining that although, roads are
made by private companies, they are public so as to justify state taxation).
102. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
103. See id. at 371 (citing California Amendment).
104. See id. at 372 (discussing background of case). The background of the
case is quite illuminating and reflective of the counter-currents ("backlash") prevalent in the early period of the "Civil Rights Movement" in America. During the
period 1959-1963, the California Legislature had enacted several statutes regulating and essentially outlawing private racial discrimination in housing. See id. at 374.
In 1964, pursuant to an initiative and referendum of the citizens of the state, Art. I,
§ 26 was added to the California state constitution. See id. It provided:
Neither the State nor any ...agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to
sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell,
lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
Id. at 371 (quoting constitutional amendment). The California Supreme Court
held that Art. I, § 2, was designed "to overturn state laws that bore on the right of
private [persons] to discriminate," that it invalidly involved the State in racial discrimination in the housing market, and that it changed the situation from one in
which discriminatory practices were restricted to one where they were "encouraged" (within the meaning of the Supreme Court's decisions). See id. at 37476.
105. See id. at 381 (agreeing with California Supreme Court's opinion that
state's action encouraged racial discrimination).
106. Id.
107. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(noting thatJustices Black, Clark, and Stewart joined Justice Harlan's dissent).
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that frames the debate on the question of government/state approval of private conduct quite well. The words of Justice Harlan
are prophetic and may portend our analysis of both Tarkanianand
Brentwood Academy. Justice Harlan wrote, "A moment of thought
will reveal the far-reaching possibilities of the Court's new doctrine,
which I am sure the Court does not intend."10 8 Justice Harlan
notes that "[e] very act of private discrimination is either forbidden
by state law or permitted by it" in some way.' 0 9 He adds:
There can be little doubt that such permissivenesswhether by express constitutional or statutory provision,
or implicit in the common law-to some extent 'encourages' those who wish to discriminate to do so. Under this
theory 'state action' in the form of laws that do nothing
more than passively permit private discrimination could
be said to tinge all private discrimination with the taint of
unconstitutional state encouragement.' 1 0
Justice Harlan argued that this type of alleged state involvement, "simply evincing a refusal to involve itself at all," is very different from cases where the Supreme Court "found active involvement
of state agencies and officials in specific acts of discrimination."' 1
Justice Harlan also noted that people acting to approve a constitutional amendment through an electoral process is "also quite different from cases in which a state enactment could be said to have the
obvious purpose of fostering discrimination."' 1 2 Justice Harlan
spoke forcefully for the view that "the state action required to bring
the Fourteenth Amendment into operation must be affirmative and
purposeful, actively fostering discrimination."' 1 3 He concluded,
"Only in such a case is ostensibly 'private' action more properly labeled 'official.' I do not believe that the mere enactment of § 26,
on the showing made here, falls within this class of cases," and Justice Harlan warns future jurists, "I think the Court has taken to it-

108. Id. at 394 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 394-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 395 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (articulating difference between encouraging action and not preventing it).
112. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964)) (expressing Court's unanimous view that statute discriminated against African-American candidates and violated Equal Protection clause of
Fourteenth Amendment).

113. Id.
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DETAILED LOOK

No State Action, No Remedy Under the

Fourteenth Amendment
UNLV, a state university, belonged to an unincorporated national association of public and private universities and colleges
(the NCAA), which regulated its members' student-athletics activities. 115 "One of the NCAA's fundamental policies 'is to maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body, and by
so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between college athletics and professional sports."116

A standing committee of the NCAA (The Committee on Infractions) investigated a series of widely reported allegations of improper athletic recruiting practices by UNLV. Subsequently, the
NCAA issued a report that concluded that there had been numerous violations of the association's rules, including several violations
by the university's successful head basketball coach, Jerry
Tarkanian. 117 A NCAA report detailed thirty-eight NCAA rule violations by UNLV personnel, with ten violations personally involving
Coach Tarkanian. 118 The NCAA proposed a series of sanctions
against the university, including a two-year probation period.1 1 9
The NCAA also requested the university to "show cause" as to why
114. Id. at 395-96 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. See generally W. Burlette Carter, The Age of Innocence: The First 25 Years of
the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
211 (2006) (providing NCAA's historical background). There is no question that a
state university like UNLV is a state actor. When UNLV decided to impose a serious disciplinary sanction upon one of its tenured employees, it was required to
comply with the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Bd. of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Thus, when UNLV notified Tarkanian that
it would separate him from all relations with the university's basketball program,
UNLV clearly acted under color of state law within the meaning of Section 1983.
116. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988) (delineating purpose of
NCAA).
117. See id. at 185 (setting out facts which led to litigation).
118. See id. at 181 (motivating UNLV to take action against Tarkanian).
119. See id. (describing actions taken by NCCA). Among the sanctions that
the Committee may impose "against an institution" are:
(1) Reprimand and censure;
(2) Probation for one year;
(3) Probation for more than one year;
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additional penalties should not to be imposed if the university
failed to remove the coach completely from the university's intercollegiate athletic program during the probation period. 20 The
council of the association reviewed and approved the committee's
investigation and hearing process and adopted the committee's recommendations; the president of the university then ordered the
coach to be suspended for the probation period. 12 1 Afterwards,
during a university administrative hearing, the hearing officer
doubted the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of various witnesses who had testified against Coach Tarkanian. 12 2 The
hearing officer, however, concluded that, "given the terms of the
university's relationship with the NCAA," the university could not
123
substitute its own judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses.
The coach, facing demotion and a drastic cut in pay, brought suit
in a Nevada state court against the university and a number of its
officers and alleged that, in violation of Section 1983, he had been
deprived of various rights, including the right to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 124 Eventually, the NCAA was joined
(4) Ineligibility for one or more National Collegiate Championship
events;
(5) Ineligibility for invitational and postseason meets and tournaments;
(6) Ineligibility for any television programs subject to the Association's
control or administration;
(7) Ineligibility of the member to vote or its personnel to serve on committees of the Association, or both;
(8) Prohibition against an intercollegiate sports team or teams participating against outside competition for a specified period;
(9) Prohibition against the recruitment of prospective student-athletes
for a sport or sports for a specified period ....
Id. at 185 n.6.
120. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 181 (detailing NCAA request to UNLV).
121. See id. at 187 (detailing final events leading to Tarkanian's suspension).
122. See id. at 186-87 (mentioning doubts about witness's testimony).
123. Id. Actually, the hearing office noted that UNLV had three options:
* Reject the sanction requiring us to disassociate Coach Tarkanian from
the athletic program and take the risk of still heavier sanctions, e.g.,
possible extra years of probation.
" Recognize the University's delegation to the NCAA of the power to act
as ultimate arbiter of these matters, thus reassigning Mr. Tarkanian
from his present position-though tenured and without adequate notice-even while believing that the NCAA was wrong.
" Pull out of the NCAA completely on the grounds that you will not execute what you hold to be their unjust judgments.
Id. at 187.
124. See id. at 181 n.1 (detailing Tarkanian's salary contract). The trial court
found that Tarkanian, as head basketball coach:
is annually paid (in lieu of his salary as a professor) $125,000, plus 10% of
the net proceeds received by UNLV for participation in NCAA-authorized
championship games, plus fees from basketball camps and clinics, product endorsements, and income realized from writing a newspaper col-
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as a defendant, and the Nevada trial court ruled against both UNLV
and the NCAA. 125 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada generally affirmed the trial court's grant of injunctive relief against the
NCAA but narrowed the scope of the relief sought.' 26 The Nevada

State Supreme Court expressed the view that the NCAA's regulatory
activity constituted state action under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and further, as a state actor, the NCAA
acts under color of state law as required in Section 1983.127 The
Nevada court also determined that the fact-finding procedures used
by the association violated the due process rights of Coach
128
Tarkanian under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The holding of the Nevada Supreme Court that the NCAA is a
state actor was based on several factors. First, the court assumed
that it was reviewing "UNLV's and the NCAA's imposition of penalties against Tarkanian," rather than the NCAA's proposed sanctions
against UNLV if it failed to discipline Tarkanian. 129 Second, the
court stated that it regarded the NCAA's regulatory activities as
state action because "many NCAA member institutions were either
public or government supported."' 3 0 Third, the court stated that
the right to discipline a public employee was "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state" and that UNLV could not escape its
responsibility for disciplinary action by delegating its duty to a private entity. 13 ' The court also cited Lugar,where the Court held that
the deprivation of a federal right may be attributed to the State if it
umn, speaking on a radio program entitled 'THE JERRY TARKANIAN
SHOW,' and appearing on a television program bearing the same name.
That compensation was 'entirely contingent on [Tarkanian's] continued status as the Head Basketball Coach at UNLV.' As a tenured professor alone, he would have earned about $53,000 a year, the court
found.
Id.
125. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 187-89 (discussing decisions by Nevada trial
court).
126. See id. at 189 (narrowing scope of trial court's ruling to prohibit enforcement of penalties imposed on Tarkanian).
127. See id. at 190 (reasoning that government supposedly justified seeing parties as state actors). The Court continues by explaining that state action must fall
under the purview of Section 1983. See id. at 191.
128. See Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Nev. 1987) (disagreeing
with NCAA claim that process used did not violate due process).
129. Id. at 1347 (addressing imposition of penalties).
130. Id. (citing Rivas Tenoro v. Liga Athletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d
492, 495 (1st Cir. 1977)) (appealing to previous decisions).
131. Id. at 1348 (articulating court's argument that UNLV could not avoid
responsibility).
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resulted from a state-created rule and the party charged with the dep13 2
rivation can fairly be considered a state actor.
Applying Lugar, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the
NCAA's activities constituted state action. 13 3 In reviewing the holding of the Nevada Supreme Court, the Supreme Court focused on
"whether UNLV's actions in compliance with the NCAA rules and
1 34
recommendations turned the NCAA's conduct into state action.
The Supreme Court noted that the NCAA would be liable if the
NCAA's involvement in Coach Tarkanian's suspension (1) constituted state action prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and (2) was performed under color of state law
within the meaning of Section 1983.1 35 The Supreme Court reversed the holding that the NCAA's conduct did not constitute a
state action.1 3 6 The key points of the Supreme Court's decision are
summarized as follows:
9 UNLV was a member of the NCAA and enforced the
Association's rules.13 7 As a member of the Association,
UNLV impacted the formulation of various NCAA policies - especially relating to aspects of its premier bas132. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (establishing
steps to determine when deprivation of federal rights is state action).
133. See Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1349 (concluding there was state action). The
court states:
The first prong [of Lugar] is met because no third party could impose
disciplinary sanctions upon a state university employee unless the third
party received the right or privilege from the university. Thus, the deprivation which Tarkanian alleges is caused by the exercise of a right or
privilege created by the state. Also, in the instant case, both UNLV and
the NCAA must be considered state actors. By delegating authority to the
NCAA over athletic personnel decisions and by imposing the NCAA sanctions against Tarkanian, UNLV acted jointly with the NCAA.
Id.
134. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 (1988) (reexamining issue and
analysis necessary to determine state action).
135. See id. at 181-82 (explaining criteria necessary for NCAA to be found
liable).
136. See id. at 182 (reversing decision of Nevada Supreme Court).
137. See id. at 192-93 (evaluating relationship between UNLV and NCAA); see
also NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) (describing membership of NCAA).
The more than 1,250 members of the NCAA are divided into five categoies: active colleges and universities, provisional colleges and universities,
conferences, affiliated organizations, and corresponding members. The
1,024 active member schools self-determine which of three divisions they
will be classified in and must annually meet membership criteria for that
division. The active member institutions and voting conferences are the
ultimate voice in all Association decisions.
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org.
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ketball program. 138 Similarly, other NCAA members
influenced those policies, but they did not act under the
color of Nevada law because the vast majority of NCAA
139
members are located in States other than Nevada.

The Court determined that the collective membership
characteristic created an association that is independent
140
of any particular State.
Through implementation of the NCAA's rules, UNLV
may have converted the NCAA rules into state rules and the
NCAA into a state actor.'4 ' As a publicly funded statesponsored university, UNLV engaged in state action
when it embraced the NCAA's rules to govern its own
behavior regardless of whether or not UNLV participated in the creation of those rules. 142 UNLV had the
right to remove itself from the NCAA at any time and
institute its own standards, or it could remain in the
NCAA and try to make changes to rules it considered
43
"harsh, unfair, or unwieldy.'
" Coach Tarkanian argued that the NCAA's actions, including the "investigation, enforcement proceedings,
and consequent recommendations," represented state
action because it was a delegation of power by UNLV. 1 44 A

state may assign authority to a private party to create a
138. See Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 193 (explaining member's influence on NCAA
policies).
139. See id. (distinguishing UNLV from other private and public member
institutions).
140. See id. (reasoning that NCAA policy is not Nevada law); see also Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988) ("Whatever
defacto authority the [private standard-setting] Association enjoys, no official authority has been conferred on it by any government .... .").
141. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 937 (1982)) (providing alternative theory for how NCAA action might
constitute state action).
142. See id. (holding there would be state action regardless of its participation
in creating rules).
143. Id. at 194-95. The Court determines:
Neither UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's standards established
through its legislation nor its role in their formulation is a sufficient reason for concluding that the NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law
when it promulgated standards governing athlete recruitment, eligibility,
and academic performance for its athletic department or for its student
athletes.
Id. at 195.
144. Id. at 195. "UNLV, as an NCAA member, subscribed to the statement in
the Association's bylaws that NCAA 'enforcement procedures are an essential part
of the intercollegiate athletic program of each member institution."' Id.
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UNLV did not give authority to the

NCAA to take specific action against any university employee, and the NCAA could only enforce procedures
through sanctions on UNLV. 146 Any action taken
against Coach Tarkanian was that of UNLV - not the
NCAA.
" Coach Tarkanian contended that UNLV and the NCAA
were "joint participants"in state action. 4 7 Yet the interests of UNLV and the NCAA were not similar; therefore,
they were not joint participants. 148 Rather, they disagreed throughout the investigation and disciplinary
process, meaning the NCAA may not be deemed a state
49
actor on the grounds of joint participation.
" The NCAA did not possess any governmental powers to
conduct its investigation. 15 0 The NCAA's authority was
limited to imposing sanctions against UNLV, including
expelling the university from membership in the
NCAA. 151 The NCAA did not have the ability to directly
discipline Tarkanian or any other state university employee.1 52 The NCAA did not order Tarkanian's suspension but merely requested it.153
* Coach Tarkanian asserted that the NCAA had "usurped a
traditional,essentialstatefunction" through the implemen145. See id. (noting State can delegate authority to establish state actor); see
also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 (1988) (holding that private physician who
had contracted with state prison to attend to inmates' medical needs was state
actor).
146. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 195-96 (asserting no state action because no
delegation of power).
147. See id. at 196 (relying on idea that state and private parties' interests intersect); see also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding
lease between private restaurant and publicly owned parking structure constituted
joint participants in state action).
148. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196 (disputing joint participant argument).
149. See id. (noting disagreement in process negated joint participant
argument).
150. See id. at 197 (explaining NCAA's limited governmental powers). The
NCAA did not have the authority "to subpoena witnesses, to impose contempt
sanctions, or to assert sovereign authority over any individual." Id.
151. See id. (describing NCAA's power to sanction members).
152. See id. (noting limits on NCAA's power to discipline member's
employees).
153. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 197 (explaining NCAA did not directly punish
university employee). The NCAA requested UNLV "to show cause why the NCAA
should not impose additional penalties if UNLV declines to suspend Tarkanian."
Id. at 198. UNLV officials confirmed that the university was given the option to
continue to employ Tarkanian and risk additional sanctions or expulsion or voluntarily withdrawal from the NCAA. See id.
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tation of its rules. 154 The Supreme Court reasoned that

the function may be considered "critical" but not an exclusive, state function.

15 5

Tarkanian's argument was er-

roneous because it ignored the fact that the NCAA,
through its own rules, was prohibited from directly disciplining Tarkanian or any other coach. 156 Moreover,
Tarkanian's suspension was only one of many recommendations made by the NCAA for the UNLV basket15 7
ball program to comply with.
Coach Tarkanian insisted that UNLV had no choice but
to submit to the NCAA's demands since the NCAA was
so powerful. 158 The Court was not swayed by this argument. 159 The Court concluded that UNLV was acting
60
under NCAA policies, not under color of Nevada law.1
154. Id. (announcing reason behind Tarkanian's belief that NCAA was state
actor).
155. See id. (holding not exclusive state function). Coach Tarkanian supported his argument with the contention that the NCAA became a state actor
when it took control of the State's exclusive power to discipline its employees. See
id. Tarkanian contends:
[A]s to state employees connected with collegiate athletics, the NCAA
requires that its standards, procedures and determinations become the
State's standards, procedures and determinations for disciplining state
employees.... The State is obligated to impose NCAA standards, procedures and determinations making the NCAA a joint participant in the
State's suspension of Tarkanian.
Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 34-35); see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987) ("Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a traditional government
function.").
156. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198 (repudiating Tarkanian's usurpation
argument).
157. See id. (noting more than one NCAA compliance request).
158. See id. (arguing UNLV was forced to comply).
159. See id. (disagreeing with Tarkanian's argument). The Court stated:
We are not at all sure this is true, but even if we assume that a private
monopolist can impose its will on a state agency by a threatened refusal to
deal with it, it does not follow that such a private party is therefore acting
under color of state law.
Id. at 199. It was evident that UNLV wanted to remain a powerhouse among the
nation's college basketball teams, which would not be possible without membership in the NCAA and eligibility for the NCAA basketball tournament. See id. "But
that UNLV's options were unpalatable does not mean that they were nonexistent."
Id.; see alsoJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974) (noting state's assignment of monopoly status does not create state action).
160. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199 (holding not state action). The Court
focused on whether "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal
right [can] be fairly attributable to the State." Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). The Court concluded:
It would be ironic indeed to conclude that the NCAA's imposition of
sanctions against UNLV-sanctions that UNLV and its counsel, including
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As a footnote to the determination of the United States Supreme Court, in April of 1998, rather than defend itself against
charges of trying to force Coach Tarkanian out of college basket16 1
ball, the NCAA settled with the veteran coach for $2.5 million.
In response, the NCAA said the settlement was not an admission
that it had made mistakes in sanctioning Tarkanian.1 62 Tarkanian
returned to coaching in the NCAA in 1996.163
Before taking a detailed look at the views of the four dissenting
justices who would have found state action on the part of the
NCAA, and whose views seemingly prevailed in Brentwood Academy,
let's shift to the discussion of Brentwood Academy.
B.

Brentwood Academy -

State Action, Constitutional Remedy

1. Facts and Procedure
The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
(TSSAA) was created to regulate public and private high school inthe Attorney General of Nevada, steadfastly opposed during protracted
adversary proceedings-is fairly attributable to the State of Nevada. It
would have been more appropriate to conclude that UNLV conducted its
athletic program under color of the policies adopted by the NCAA,
rather than that those policies were developed and enforced under color
of Nevada law.
Id.
161. See Richard Sandomir, Maverick Coach Wins Battle and Collects from
N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at Al (detailing settlement agreement between
Tarkanian and NCAA). The dispute between Tarkanian and the NCAA had lasted
twenty-six years before it was settled the month before the lawsuit was set to go to
trial in Las Vegas, where he coached for nineteen seasons. See id. Reacting to the
settlement, Tarkanian said, "Nothing can make up for what they have done, but it
helps to clear the air, ... But they couldn't pay me enough to make up for the
agony they caused me and my family." Id.
162. See id. (refuting admission of improper sanctions). The NCAA was unsuccessful in getting a change of venue from Las Vegas, where Tarkanian was still
well-known for having coached nineteen seasons. See id. The denial of request for
change of venue influenced the decision to settle with Tarkanian. See id.
163. See Dick Weiss, Fresno State Swims with the Shark TarkanianRegains Old Fire,
but Still Sour Over UNLV Years, N.Y. DMLY NEWS, Feb. 25, 2001, at 62 (reporting
Tarkanian's career developments post-litigation with NCAA). Tarkanian returned
to college coaching at Fresno State in 1996. See id.; see also Tarkanian Retires from
Coaching, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 16, 2002, at 11 (reporting end to Tarkanian's long
coaching career). Tarkanian, with a 778-202 record, ended his NCAA coaching
career as the coach with the fourth most wins in college basketball history. Id.; see
also John Branch, Ultimately, Tark's Era Leaves Only Emptiness, FRESNo BEE, May 29,
2003, at D1 (reporting Fresno State basketball scandal). The NCAA investigated
fraudulent academic activity on the part of three basketball players on Tarkanian's
team. See id. Thirty-four Fresno State victories will be discounted because the players were ineligible to play due to the academic fraud. See id.
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terscholastic athletics in Tennessee. 16 4 Membership to the TSSAA
was not mandatory, but the majority of the state's public and private
high schools were members. 16 5 The TSSAA is comprised of two
bodies: the legislative council and the board of control. 166 Tennessee's State Board of Education has recognized TSSAA as regulator
of interscholastic athletics in the state's public schools. 167 The State
Board deleted the rule which specifically authorized the TSSAA to
regulate, yet it created a statement reaffirming the Association's
role as regulator. 168
In 1997, the TSSAA's board of control determined that Brentwood Academy, a private parochial high school belonging to the
TSSAA, violated a recruiting rule. 169 In response to the violation,
164. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 531 U.S.
288, 291 (2001) (describing function of Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA)).
165. See id. (noting 290 public high schools and 55 private schools were members). Public high schools located in Tennessee constituted 84% of the TSSAA's
members. See id.
166. See id. (outlining structure of Association). The legislative council is responsible for rulemaking while the board of control handles all administrative matters. See id. Each committee consists of nine elected members, ranging from high
school principals, assistant principals, and superintendents of member schools. See
id. The majority of meetings occur during regular school hours. See id. Members
do not receive salary from the State but are compensated with the opportunity to
participate in the State's public retirement system for its employees. See id. The
Association is only partially funded by members' dues, with the majority of revenue
coming from ticket sales at member teams' football and basketball tournaments.
See id.
167. See id. at 292 (acknowledging TSSAA's role in regulating). The State
Board of Education recognized TSSAA's role "in providing standards, rules and
regulations for interscholastic competition in public schools of Tennessee." Id. A
new amendment was adopted in 1995 which stated:
The State Board of Education recognizes the value of participation in
interscholastic athletics and the role of the Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association in coordinating interscholastic athletic competition.
The State Board of Education authorizes the public schools of the state to
voluntarily maintain membership in the Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association.
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675
(1998) (quoting Tenn. Bd. of Educ. Rule 0520-1-2-.08 and Docket No. 66).
168. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 292-93 (revising rule which named
TSSAA as regulator). The State Board revised the rule to acknowledge "the value
of participation in interscholastic athletics and the role of [the Association] in coordinating interscholastic athletic competition, while authoriz[ing] the public
schools of the state to voluntarily maintain membership in [the Association]." Id.
169. See id. at 293 (noting facts of regulatory proceeding). The Association
concluded that Brentwood engaged in "undue influence in recruiting student athletes, when it wrote to incoming students and their parents about spring football
practice." Id.; see also Brentwood Acad., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 673-74 (detailing TSSAA's
Recruiting Rule).
The use of undue influence on a student (with or without an athletic
record), his or her parents or guardians of a student by any person con-
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the TSSAA (1) placed the school's athletic program on probation
for four years, (2) prohibited the school's football and boys' basketball teams from competing in state playoffs for two years, and (3)
sanctioned the school with a $3,000 fine. 170 The school argued that
enforcing the rule and penalties constituted "state action" and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 171 The District Court ruled that
the TSSAA was a "state actor" under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 172 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment and held that
the TSSAA was not a state actor because the TSSAA (1) had no
symbiotic relationship with the state, (2) was not engaging in a
traditional and exclusive public function, and (3) was not respond173
ing to state compulsion.
2.

The Supreme Court's Rationale - Distinguishingits Tarkanian
Decision

On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that the
TSSAA had engaged in state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it enforced the "no recruiting" rule against the
member school. 174 The Supreme Court based its decision on two
nected, or not connected, with the school to secure or to retain a student
for athletic purposes shall be a violation of the recruiting rule.
Q. How is undue influence interpreted in the recruiting rule?
A. A person or persons exceeding what is appropriate or normal and offering an incentive or inducement to a student with or without an athletic
record.
Q. What is the penalty for violation of the recruiting rule?
A. Violation of the recruiting rule shall cause the student to be ineligible
at the school in violation, and a penalty shall be placed against the
school.
Brentwood Acad., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 673-74.
170. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 293 (outlining punishment infliction on
Brentwood Academy for recruiting violations). The penalties were affirmed by the
voting members of the board of control and legislative council, which were both
comprised of public school administrators. See id.
171. See id. (claiming state action). Brentwood Academy sued the TSSAA for
a violation of § 1983. See id.
172. See id. (explaining procedural history of case). The District Court entered summaryjudgment for the school and prohibited the TSSAA from enforcing
the rule. See id. The District Court concluded that the TSSAA was a state actor
because the "State had delegated authority over high school athletics to the Association, characterized the relationship between the Association and its public school
members as symbiotic, and emphasized the predominantly public character of the
Association's membership and leadership." Id.
173. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 294 (noting reasons Court did not find
state action). Because there was no strict test for the Court to apply in determining whether it was a state action, the court applied criteria stemming from precedent. See id.
174. See id. at 291 (holding TSSAA's actions constituted state action).
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major factors: (1) the "pervasive entwinement" of state school officials in the TSSAA's structure and (2) the fact that it was reasonable
175
to apply constitutional standards to the TSSAA.

The question becomes what was the major difference or distinction between Tarkanianand Brentwood Academy. Can any distinction be attributed to a unique interpretation of facts, a change in
the composition of the Court, or even a shift in the viewpoint of
one of the senior justices, Justice Stevens?
The Court analyzed whether the TSSAA, as regulator of public
and private school interscholastic athletics, was a state actor when it
enforced a recruiting violation against a member school. 176 The
Court examined the relationship between state action and the
Fourteenth Amendment. 177 The Court recognized the essential dilemma found in many Fourteenth Amendment cases. 178 The Court
175. See id. at 298 (stating basis for state action). The Court applied the "necessarily fact-bound inquiry" to conclude it was a state action. Id. (quoting Lugar,
457 U.S. at 939). The private nature of the TSSAA was overshadowed by the involvement of public institutions and public officials. See id.
176. See id. at 290 (framing issue for analysis). The Court acknowledged that
a number of other courts have recognized statewide athletic associations as state
actors. Id. at 295; see also, e.g., Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n., 822 F.2d
671, 674 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding "overwhelmingly public character of the IHSA
membership is sufficient to confer state action for the purposes of § 1983"); Clark
v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n., 695 F.2d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1982) (1983) (holding
athletic association's regulations met state action requirements); In re United
States ex rel. Miss. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n., 682 F.2d 147, 151 (8th Cir.
1982) (holding rules governed state action because association consisted mainly of
public schools); Moreland v. Western Pa. Interscholastic Athletic League, 572 F.2d
121, 125 (3d Cir. 1978) (conceding state action); La. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n. v.
St. Augustine High Sch., 396 F.2d 224, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding private
high school was state actor); Okla. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n. v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269,
272-73 (10th Cir. 1963) (holding association comprised of public schools was state
actor); Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Ind. 1997)
(holding state action for decision regarding student-athletes); Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768, 774-75 (Miss. 1994) (holding rule requiring students to reside in district in order to participate in interscholastic athletics
was form of state action); Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734,
736 (R.I. 1992) (finding interscholastic league's rules are form of state action).
177. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295 (examining line between state action
and Fourteenth Amendment). The Court reasons:
If the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be displaced, therefore, its ambit
cannot be a simple line between States and people operating outside formally governmental organizations, and the deed of an ostensibly private
organization or individual is to be treated sometimes as if a State had
caused it to be performed.
Id.
178. Id. (explaining attempts to "plot a line between state action subject to
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny and private conduct"). The Court continues:
The judicial obligation is not only to 'preserve an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law' and avoid the imposition of
responsibility on a State for conduct it could not control, but also to as-
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focused on the "close nexus between the State and challenged action [to determine if the private action] may be fairly treated as that
1 79
of the State itself.
Justice Souter concentrated on what he believed was the most
important consideration in imposing the due process obligations of
the Fourteenth Amendment. "Thus, we say that state action may be
found if, though only if, there is such a 'close nexus between the
State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior
'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'

18 0

",

The Court identified reasons to fairly attribute activity to the
government.1 8 ' Previously, the Court found the activity of a private
actor to be a state action in many circumstances. 18 2 The Court has
treated a nominally private entity as a state actor.1 8 3 Thus, the application of the "entwinement doctrine" becomes not only the answer to the State Athletic Association's arguments offered to
persuade the Court that the facts would not support a finding of
state action under various criteria applied in other cases; the application of the "entwinement doctrine" is also a discrete insight into
the possible further jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court - whether or not this expansion of due process rights continues to be supported in the future.
To distinguish Brentwood Academy from Tarkanian,Justice Sou-

ter reflected on the Tarkaniandecision and noted that the NCAA's
policies "were shaped not by the University of Nevada alone, but by
sure that constitutional standards are invoked 'when it can be said that
the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff

complains.'
Id. (quoting Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 191 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,

1004 (1982))).
179. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
295 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351

(1974)).
180. Id. ("If a defendant's conduct satisfies the state-action requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the conduct also constitutes action 'under color of
state law' for § 1983 purposes.") (citing Jackson, U.S. at 351 n.2).
181. See id. at 295-96 (setting forth comprehensive factors for state action).
182. See id. at 296 (detailing previous state action holdings); see also Blum, 457
U.S. at 1004 (1982) (finding state action resulting from State's exercise of "coercive power" or significant encouragement); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 941 (1982) (finding state action when private actor acts as "willful participant
in joint activity with the State or it agents").
183. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296 (characterizing private entities as
state actors); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (finding state action
when it has been "delegated a function of the state"); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 299 (1966) (holding state action when "entwined with governmental policies"); Pa. v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts of Phila., 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (holding
state actor when "controlled by an agency of the State").
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several hundred member institutions, most of them having no con18 4
nection with Nevada, and exhibiting no color of Nevada law."
Justice Souter conceded that because it would be difficult to see the
NCAA, "not as a collective membership, but as surrogate for the
one State, we held the organization's connection with Nevada too
18 5
insubstantial to ground a state action claim."
The situation, however, was quite different in Brentwood Academy. Justice Souter wrote:
To complement the entwinement of public school officials
with the Association from the bottom up, the State of Tennessee has provided for entwinement from top down.
State Board members are assigned ex officio to serve as
members of the board of control and legislative council,
and the Association's ministerial employees are treated as
state employees to the extent of being eligible for membership in the state retirement system.
For the same reason, it avails the Association nothing
to stress that the State neither coerced nor encouraged
the actions complained of. "Coercion" and "encouragement" are like "entwinement" in referring to kinds of facts
that can justify characterizing an ostensibly private action
as public instead. Facts that address any of these criteria
are significant, but no one criterion must necessarily be
applied. When, therefore, the relevant facts show pervasive entwinement to the point of largely overlapping identity, the implication of state action is not affected by
pointing out that the facts might not loom large under a
186
different test.
The Court rejected the other arguments made by the TSSAA as being "beside the point, simply because the facts justify a conclusion
of state action under the criterion of entwinement, a conclusion in
no sense unsettled merely because other criteria of state action may
187
not be satisfied by the same facts."
184. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 297-98 (citing Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193).
185. Id. (citing Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 193, 196).
186. Id. at 300-03 (citations omitted).
187. Id. at 302. The TSSAA placed great stress on the "public function test,"
as found in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn. See generally Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
The Court explained:
There, an apparently private school provided education for students
whose special needs made it difficult for them to finish high school. The
record, however, failed to show any tradition of providing public special
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THE DISSENTING JUSTICES IN BOTH TARKANIAN AND BREN-WOOD
ACADEM.

AN INSIGHT INTO THE FUTURE?

The dissenting opinions in both Tarkanianand Brentwood Acad-

emy may provide insight into what a future United States Supreme
Court might do if the core issue presented in both cases comes
again before the Court. Justice White, himself an accomplished collegiate athlete,18 8 wrote the dissenting opinion in Tarkanian.18 9 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined him.1 90 Recall,
however, that Justice Stevens was in the majority in both cases Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall are long gone from the
Court and Justice O'Connor and the late Chief Justice, William
Rehnquist, have been replaced by Chief Justice John Roberts and
Associate Justice Samuel Alito. 19 1 Justice Stevens, who may have
cast the decisive fifth-vote in both cases, remains.
A.

The TarkanianDissent

Both the majority and the dissent agreed that UNLV was a state
actor and that Tarkanian's suspension was state action. 19 2 The dissent, however, framed the issues as "whether the NCAA acted

jointly with UNLV in suspending Tarkanian and thereby also beeducation to students unable to cope with a regular school, who had historically been cared for (or ignored) according to private choice. It was
true that various public school districts had adopted the practice of referring students to the school and paying their tuition, and no one disputed
that providing the instruction aimed at a proper public objective and conferred a public benefit. But we held that the performance of such a public function did not permit a finding of state action on the part of the
school unless the function performed was exclusively and traditionally
public, as it was not in that case. The Association argues that application
of the public function criterion would produce the same result here, and
we will assume, arguendo, that it would. But this case does not turn on a
public function test, any more than Rendell-Baker had anything to do with
entwinement of public officials in the special school.
Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 302-03.
188. The Largest Football Statistics and History Database Online, http://www
.databasefootball.com/players/playerpage.htm?ilkid=WHITEWHl01
(last visited
March 2, 2007) (providing player statistics).
189. See Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 199 (listing Justices White, Brennan, Marshall,
and O'Connor as dissenting in Tarkanian).
190. Id.
191. Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.gov
(last visited March 2, 2007) (listing information about past and present Supreme
CourtJustices). Justice White retired on June 28, 1993;Justice Brennan retired on
July 20, 1990; Justice Marshall retired on October 1, 1991; Justice O'Connor retired on January 31, 2006; and ChiefJustice Rehnquist died on September 3, 2005.
See id.

192. See Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 199 (White, J., dissenting) (noting agreement
among majority and dissent regarding state action).
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came a state actor."'193 Justice White stated that he would have held
that the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV in suspending
Tarkanian.

94

The dissent based its conclusion on the fact that UNLV, adhering to NCAA's rules, suspended Coach Tarkanian for the violation
of those rules. 195 Referring to the Nevada Supreme Court opinion
96 Justice White noted
in University of Nevada v. Tarkanian,1
that
NCAA rules provide that NCAA "enforcement procedures are an
essential part of the intercollegiate athletic program of each member institution."'1 97 Under an agreement between the NCAA and
UNLV, the NCAA was to conduct hearings regarding violations of
its rules. 198 According to NCAA's procedures, and subject to appeal
to the NCAA Council, the NCAA Committee on Infractions ultimately determines facts related to alleged violations. 199 Despite
UNLV's own investigation into the alleged recruiting violations by
Coach Tarkanian, "the NCAA conducted the very hearings the Nevada Supreme Court held to have violated Tarkanian's right to procedural due process. '20 0 Although, in fact, the only issue before the
Supreme Court was the threshold question of whether the NCAA
20
had acted jointly with UNLV. 1
In addition, UNLV contracted to be bound by NCAA's findings
of fact under the agreement. 2°2 UNLV's appointed hearing officer
ruling on Tarkanian's suspension "expressly agreed to accept the
20 3
NCAA's findings of fact as in some way superior to [its] own."
Thus, "it was the NCAA's express findings that Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules, made at NCAA-conducted hearings, all of which
193. Id.at 200.
194. See id.
195. See id.at 201.
196. 594 P. 2d 1159, 1160 (Nev. 1979) ("[A]s a member of the NCAA, UNLV
contractually agrees to administer its athletic program in accordance with NCAA
legislation.").
197. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 201 (White, J., dissenting).
198. See id. (discussing details of agreement between UNLV and NCAA).
199. See id. (discussing procedure for determining whether violation has
occurred).
200. Id.
201. See id. at 201 n.1 (noting grant of petition was limited to state action
question).
202. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 201 (White, J., dissenting).
203. Id.at 201 (internal quotations omitted). "[According to] the terms of
UNLV's membership in the NCAA, the NCAA's findings were final and not subject
to further review by any other body, and it was for that reason that UNLV suspended Tarkanian, despite concluding that many of those findings were wrong."
Id.
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UNLV agreed to in its membership agreement with the NCAA, that
resulted in Tarkanian's suspension by UNLV. ''20 4
Commenting on the majority's statement that UNLV was free
to withdraw from the NCAA at any time, Justice White conceded
that one of UNLV's options was to withdraw from the NCAA en-

tirely. 20 5 Seemingly dismissing this argument, and analogizing Den-

nis v. Sparks, Justice White concluded that "[w] hat mattered was not
that he [(Dennis)] could have withdrawn, but rather that he did
not do S0."206
Moreover, even if the NCAA and UNLV were adversaries
throughout the proceedings before the NCAA, a fact heavily relied
on by the majority, their agreement was not undercut. 20 7 Citing the
majority, "[i] t would be ironic indeed to conclude that the NCAA's
imposition of sanctions against UNLV - sanctions that UNLV and
its counsel, including the Attorney General of Nevada, steadfastly
opposed during protracted adversary proceedings - is fairly attributable to the State of Nevada." 20 8 While agreeing, Justice White
found it not to be applicable because UNLV did not refuse to suspend Tarkanian, an action that would have led to sanctions by the
NCAA. 209 Rather, UNLV did suspend Tarkanian because it had
adopted the NCAA rules and the results of the hearing conducted
by the NCAA. 2 10 Based on those facts, the dissent concluded that
"the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV and therefore is a state
2 11
actor."

204. Id. at 202.
205. See id. (noting UNLV is not required to be member of NCAA). It is the
author's opinion, however, that the ability of UNLV to withdraw from the NCAA is
more theoretical than practical, because inter-collegiate contests are held within
NCAA leagues.
206. Id. at 203 (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)).
207. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 203 (White, J., dissenting) (citing majority
opinion, 488 U.S. at 196).
208. Id. (citing majority opinion, 488 U.S. at 199).
209. See id. (noting that "it would be hard indeed to find any state action that
harmed Tarkanian" if UNLV had not suspended Tarkanian).
210. See id. ("Here, UNLV did suspend Tarkanian, and it did so because it
embraced the NCAA rules governing conduct of its athletic program and adopted
the results of the hearings conducted by the NCAA concerning Tarkanian, as it
had agreed that it would.").
211. Id. at 203.
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The Brentwood Academy Dissent

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in Brentwood Academy. 2 1 2 At the
outset, Justice Thomas addressed the "entwinement doctrine" by
never found state action based upon mere
stating, "[w]e have
'entwinement."' 213 Moreover, Justice Thomas noted that the Court
has "found a private organization's acts to constitute state action
only when the organization performed a public function; was created, coerced, or encouraged by the government; or acted in a
symbiotic relationship with the government."' 2 14 Next, Justice
Thomas stated, "[t] he majority's holding -

that the ...

[TSSAA's]

enforcement of its recruiting rule is state action - not only extend[ed] the state-action doctrine beyond its permissible limits but
also encroache [d] upon the realm of individual freedom that the
21 5
doctrine was meant to protect."
Justice Thomas emphatically explained the basis for his dissenting opinion. Quoting Lugar,Justice Thomas reiterated, "[c] areful
adherence to the state action requirement ...

preserves an area of

individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal
judicial power. '2 16 Further, adherence to the traditional formulation of the state-action doctrine also promotes important values of
federalism by "avoid ling] the imposition of responsibility on a State
for conduct it could not control" 2 17 to determine whether an individual action performed by a private party "can fairly be attributed
218
to the State."

Examining the case at hand, Justice Thomas stated that common sense alone, without use of the state-action tests, points to the
conclusion that the action could not be attributed to Tennessee because the State of Tennessee did not createthe TSSAA, does not fund
the TSSAA, and neither directly nor indirectly compensates
TSSAA's employees. 2 19 Furthering his position, Justice Thomas
212. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S.
288, 305 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy,
and Chief Justice joined Thomas's dissent).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 306 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936
(1982)).
217. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 305 (citing Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 191).
218. Id. (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004).
219. See id. at 306-08 (explaining why TSSAA's actions cannot be attributed to
Tennessee). While the TSSAA's employees are statutorily permitted to participate
in the state retirement system, Tennessee does not contribute to their compensa-
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pointed out that member school dues only make up four percent of

the TSSAA's income while the majority comes from the state tournaments that it sponsors and organizes. 220

In addition to the

TSSAA not being allowed to use state-owned facilities for a discounted or reduced fee and not being exempt from state taxation,
Tennessee does not permit the State, or a group on behalf of the
state, to organize interscholastic athletics. 22 1 Justice Thomas spotlights the fact that Tennessee's sole acknowledgment of the TSSAA
is a rule stating that the State Board of Education permits public

22
schools to choose if they want to be members of the TSSAA.2
Tennessee did not participate in the TSSAA's action against
Brentwood Academy. In fact, enforcement of the TSSAA's recruiting rule, prohibiting members from using "undue influence" on
students or their parents or guardians "to secure or to retain a student for athletic purposes," was designed by member schools themselves in order to preserve athletic balance among member
schools. 223 Justice Thomas noted that there was no indication that
the State was involved with the enforcement of the recruitment regulations. 224 The TSSAA's authority to enforce its recruiting rules
comes solely from the membership contracts that each school signs
when they join the TSSAA. 225 The contract states that the school
agrees to conduct its athletic program in accordance with the rules,
226
policies, and decisions of the TSSAA.
Traditionally, the organization of interscholastic sports has not
been a state function in Tennessee, demonstrated by the fact that
tion. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-35-118 (1993)

(dictating Tennessee does not pay
TSSAA employees).
220. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 307 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining
TSSAA not financially state entity).
221. See id. (providing additional examples demonstrating that Tennessee
does not treat TSSAA as state entity).
222. See id. at 308 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (pointing out sole instance Tennessee addresses TSSAA). The rule provides:
The State Board of Education recognizes the value of participation
in interscholastic athletics and the role of the Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association in coordinating interscholastic athletic competition. The State Board of Education authorizes the public schools of
the state to voluntarily maintain membership in the Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association.
TENN. COMP. R. & REcs. 0520-1-2.08(1) (2000).
223. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 306 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting TSSAA
regulations are enforced by own board, not by state agency).
224. See id. at 308 (emphasizing State had no control over enforcement of
recruitment regulations).
225. See id. (explaining where TSSAA's authority comes from).
226. See id. (describing contents of membership contracts).
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the TSSAA had been in existence for forty-seven years before the
Tennessee government showed any interest in regulation of interscholastic sports. 22 7 When the state did begin to take interest, the
State Board of Education only went along with what the TSSAA had
already established. 2 28 Justice Thomas continued his dissent by expanding on the TSSAA's objectives. In 1925, the TSSAA was privately incorporated with the main purpose of organizing
interscholastic athletic tournaments. 229 There has never been any
indication that the Tennessee state government helped create the
TSSAA or control its management. 230 Although the current TSSAA
board is made up of all public school officials and the majority of its
members are public schools, there is no requirement in the TSSAA
Constitution that requires the public school system to be served by
23 1
the TSSAA.
There is no record that the State has pressured the TSSAA or
dictated how the TSSAA must regulate their interscholastic activities. 23 2 Specifically, there is no indication that the enforcement of
the recruiting rule came from the state - the rule came from the
TSSAA's board, which is granted that authority in the membership
schools' contracts specifically. 2 33 Justice Thomas contended there
is not a symbiotic relationship between the TSSAA and the Tennessee state government as the TSSAA is treated the same as many
companies who contract their services to the government. 23 4 Here,
227. See id. at 309 (describing tradition of interscholastic sports regulated by
TSSAA, not Tennessee). Up until the twentieth century, the students themselves
organized most interscholastic sports. See id. (explaining non-existent role of state
government in organizing interscholastic sports). The first known incident of
school-regulated athletics in the country was in 1896, when a group of teachers in
Wisconsin created a committee to organize and regulate sports contests. See id.
(indicating first known incident of school-run athletics).
228. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 309 (suggesting Tennessee's interest was
not to regulate but merely to approve TSSAA's actions). The Court in FlaggBrothers, Inc. v. Brooks determined that a state's approval of a private party's actions is
not enough to hold that state accountable for those actions. See 436 U.S. 149, 16465 (1978); cf. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) ("Mere approval of or
acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding
the State responsible for those initiatives under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
229. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 310 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (indicating
founding objectives of TSSAA).
230. See id. (describing lack of state involvement in TSSAA's formation and
management).
231. See id. (discussing TSSAA board composition).
232. See id. at 311 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting no record that Tennessee

interfered with TSSAA's regulation of scholastic activities).
233. See id. (describing where TSSAA's board received their authority).
234. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 311 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (contending
there was no symbiotic relationship between State and TSSAA but instead TSSAA
acted like any other contractor for services).
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the TSSAA's contracted service is organizing athletic tournaments. 235 Thomas further comments on what he believes to be a
novel approach to the issue of "state action. ' 236 Because none of

the existing state-action theories or common sense could establish
TSSAA's enforcement theories as a state action, the majority created a new theory which identified factors that show "entwinement"
between the state and the TSSAA. 2 37 Justice Thomas seemingly
complains that the majority did not define "entwinement" and that
23 8
there is no support in the Court's state-action jurisprudence.
Thomas challenged the majority's examples of entwinement analysis by pointing out state action was never previously established
23 9
solely by entwinement.
VI.

THE LESSONS OF

TARANN

AND BRENTWOOD

AcADEMY

The majority in Brentwood Academy applied but never fully defined "entwinement." Therefore, the scope of its holding remains
unclear. Justice Thomas's criticism, however, is both stinging and
direct. Justice Thomas remarked, "[i]f we are fortunate, the major240
ity's fact-specific analysis will have little bearing beyond this case."

He warned that should the majority's new entwinement test develop in future years and become an accepted basis for finding
"state action," it could affect many activities in high schools, not

235. See id. (describing service provided by TSSAA).
236. See id. at 312 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining Justice Thomas' opinion of majority's approach).
237. See id. (describing entwinement approach used by majority).
238. See id. (noting majority never defined entwinement in opinion). Justice
Thomas wryly notes that two of the cases that the majority cited did not even use
the word "entwinement." See id. (suggesting majority did not properly explain new
approach). One of the cases was Evans v. Newton, which provided no more support
to an "entwinement" theory than did Lebron v. NationalRailroadPassengerCorp. and
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia. See id. at 313 (citing
Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995); Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts of Phila.,
353 U.S. 230 (1957)) (using Evans as example of Court's use of entwinement approach). Although Evans at least used the word "entwined," the Court did not
discuss entwinement as a distinct concept, let alone one that would be sufficient to
transform a private entity into a state actor when traditional theories of state action
do not. See id. (citing Evans, 382 U.S. at 299, 302) (furthering point by showing
Court used undefined entwinement approach when other theories did not work).
239. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 314 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (challenging
majority's position that entwinement theory alone issufficient to show state
action).
240. Id.
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merely athletics. 241 Moreover, the impact of the Court's holding
in Brentwood Academy could be staggering if extended to other state
2 42
controlled organizations.
Nonetheless, Justice Thomas might have misplaced his concern. Currently, three of the dissenters in Brentwood Academy, Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy, remain on the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice John Roberts replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Samuel Alito replaced Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who
was in the majority in Brentwood Academy. 243 Whether Justice Alito
and ChiefJustice Roberts desert their more conservative "brethren"
will determine if the reaches of the Fourteenth Amendment will
extend to this type of private conduct. 244 Justice Stevens, who seemingly "changed sides" from Tarkanian to Brentwood Academy, is now
241. See id. (explaining various school-sponsored activities which state-action
analysis could extend to including high school agriculture, mathematics, music,
marching band, and cheerleading).
242. See id. (listing examples of publicly funded activities that could potentially be affected, including firefighters, policemen, and teachers).
243. See id. at 290 (listing Justice O'Connor with majority).
244. See generally Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will the New
Supreme Court Grant Gays the Right to Marry? 14 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'v & L.
253 (2006) (questioning how far entwinement approach can reach under Fourteenth Amendment). By looking at ChiefJustice Roberts' legal history, one might
attempt to decipher how he will vote. Although Chief Justice Roberts served as a
law clerk for the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, "itis not so easy to determine whether Roberts is cut from the same anti-gay cloth as his former mentor."
Id. at 303. When Roberts was deputy solicitor general, he wrote briefs opposing
abortion and advocating for the reversal of Roe v. Wade, and it could be argued that
overruling Roe would threaten the fundamental rights of privacy and liberty which
include freedom of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender Americans. However,
when the law firm he once worked for agreed to represent a gay rights group in
Romer v. Evans, Roberts helped prepare their arguments. See generally 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (pointing out significance of Chief Justice Robert's participation in gay
rights case).
Proponents of expanding the Fourteenth Amendment to encompass a right
of gay marriage are also concerned about the views ofJustice Samuel Alito. Similar
to ChiefJustice Roberts, Justice Alito has an extensive record of attacking the constitutionality of Roe v. Wade. Fairly or unfairly, Justice Alito was widely criticized for
comments he made on a 1985 application for a political appointment within the
Reagan administration when he said that he was "particularly proud" of his work
on cases in which he argued that the Constitution does not protect a right to abortion. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David D. Kirkpatrick, Nominee Plays Down Remarks
on Quotas and Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A16 (discussingJustice Alito's
comments concerning his personal conservative view on constitutional right to
abortion). More alarmingly to some, as a judge on the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, Alito authored a dissenting opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in
which he wrote, "Pennsylvania has a legitimate interest in furthering the husband's
interest in the fate of the fetus." 947 F.2d 682, 726 (3d Cir. 1991). The Supreme
Court rejected this view, which would have required a woman seeking an abortion
to first notify her husband before taking any action. See Stolberg and Kirkpatrick,
supra (stating Supreme Court's holding). Professor Lester opines, "Alito's record
on gay rights issues during his time serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
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the senior justice on the Court and is joined in his view by Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg, both standing firm in their expansive view of
the reaches of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 24 5
Barring some unpredictable event, it appears that the notion generated from the ruling in Brentwood Academy that state action could be
predicated upon the notion of "entwinement" may no longer command a majority on the Court.
Justice Thomas's dissent in Brentwood Academy may prove to be
most prophetic. Now may be the appropriate time for the Court to
revisit its decision in Brentwood Academy so that it falls more in line
with the more traditional state-action analysis used in Tarkanian, or
at least so that it asserts in more formal terms that the "entwinement doctrine" is not a departure from the Court's prior understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Regardless of the
outcome, the issue deserves the clarity that the Court's further review will provide.

Third Circuit during the past fifteen years is a bit more mixed." Lester, supra at
305.
In a case closely related to the issue of gay marriage, Justice Alito offered a
very traditional reading of the meaning of marriage. See Adam Liptak, In Abortion
Rulings, Idea of Marriage is Pivotal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al (pointing out
another case in whichJustice Alito took conservative stance). In a case concerning
a university anti-harassment policy that prohibited the harassment of gays and
other minorities, Alito sided with the majority that ruled the policy was an infringement of first amendment rights and therefore unconstitutional. See Kathi Wolfe,
Alito's Record on Gay Rights a Mixed Bag, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.progressive.org
(describing Alito's position on anti-harassment of gays and minorities policy); Lou
Chibbaro, Jr., Gay Groups Oppose Alito Nomination, Dec. 12, 2005, http://www.washblade.com/thelatest/thelatest.cfm?blog-id=4008 (discussing Alito's view on freedom of speech and anti-harassment speech codes). In a later case, Justice Alito
ruled that a New Jersey school district was obligated to fund a male student's transfer to a new school because the student was being called "faggot," "homo," and
"gay" and harassed because he was perceived to be effeminate by his classmates.
See Wolfe, supra (describing Alito's position in another case concerning gay rights).
Finally in a case that addressed the right of a municipality to block HIV-positive
adults from becoming foster parents to non-HIV-positive foster children, Justice
Alito wrote that the municipality's policy discriminates against the son's HIV-positive status even though there is almost no possibility of HIV transmission. See id.
(citing Doe v. County of Centre, 242 F.3d 437, 451 (3d Cir. 2001)) (pointing out
another case where Alito took conservative role).
245. For further discussion of state-action analysis in Tarkanianand Brentwood
Academy, see supra notes 42-121 and 134-67 and accompanying text.
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